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Cross-border trade remains a contentious issue in the restructuring of the European electricity market. 
Difficulties stem from the lack of a common market design, the separation between energy and 
transmission markets and the insufficient coordination between Transmission System Operators 
(TSOs). This paper analyzes the cross-border trade problem through a set of models that represent 
different degrees of coordination both between the energy and transmission markets and among 
national TSOs. 
We first present the optimal organisation, not implemented in Europe, where energy and 
transmission are integrated according to the nodal price paradigm and Power Exchanges (PXs) and 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) are integrated. This is our reference case. We then move to a 
more realistic representation of the European electricity market based on the so-called market-
coupling design where energy and transmission are operated separately by PXs and TSOs. When 
considering different degrees of coordination of the national TSOs' activities, we unexpectedly find 
that some arrangements are more efficient than the lack of coordination might suggest. Specifically we 
find that even without a formal coordination of the TSOs' counter-trading operations, non 
discriminatory access to common counter-trading resources for all TSOs may lead to a partial implicit 
coordination of these TSOs. In other words, an internal market of counter-trading resources partially 
substitutes the lack of integration of the TSOs. While a full access to counter-trading resources is a 
weaker requirement than the horizontal integration of the TSOs, it is still quite demanding. We show 
that quantitative limitations to the access of these resources decrease the efficiency of counter-trading. 
The paper supposes price taking agents and hence leaves aside the incentive to game the system 
induced by zonal systems. 
Keywords 
Cross-Border Energy Trade, Market-Coupling, Counter-Trading, Coordination, Generalized Nash 
Equilibrium. 
JEL Classification: C68, E40.  
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1. Introduction 
Experience indicates that the restructuring of the electricity sector towards competition is more 
complicated than foreseen. Specifically while the application of first economic principles on 
Kirchhoff's laws tells us that electricity should be differentiated by location and hence that the energy 
and transmission markets should be integrated, the argument that this makes the market unnecessarily 
complicated has been widely advocated. The pressure for market organizations based on a coarse 
geographic differentiation of the product has thus been considerable. Similarly the lack of storability 
of electricity suggests the need for a very strong coordination among all agents involved in the market. 
Here again the argument has been that this departs too much from normal market operations, leading 
to a considerable pressure to retain as much decentralization in the market as possible. This joint 
pressure for a loose geographic differentiation of electricity prices and a rather decentralized 
organisation of the energy and transmission markets has been encountered throughout the world. It is 
also present in Europe where the problem is made more acute by the legal requirement to construct a 
single electricity market.  
These difficulties have been particularly striking in the organisation of cross-border trade among 
Member States that stakeholders have now been discussing since more than 10 years. This paper 
attempts to model different market organisations inspired by these discussions and the possibilities 
offered by the third legislative package (see [6]) to introduce multinational Transmission System 
Operators (TSOs) to deal with congestion issues.  
It has now been abundantly argued both on the basis of theory and successful restructuring 
experiences that electricity markets should rely on an organization where transmission and energy 
clear simultaneously at spatial level. This system is now implemented in the restructured part of the 
US electricity market. The model accounts for the physical properties of the electricity commodity and 
the characteristics of the grid. We refer to this situation as Model 1 and take it as our benchmark. From 
an economic point of view, Model 1 represents a complete market where all spatial arbitrage 
opportunities allowed by the physical constraints of the grid are traded away.  
While this type of market exists and is operated successfully in different regions of the world, it is 
not accepted in Europe. The most sophisticated organisation of cross border trade in the continental 
European electricity market is known as Market-Coupling (MC) (see Belpex web site). It is currently 
operated between Belgium, France and The Netherlands and should soon be extended to the Western 
border of Germany. This organisation can be described as follows. TSOs provide the national PXs 
with a simplified representation of the network that is meant to represent its transmission possibilities. 
The PXs then clear national and international energy markets within the simplified representation of 
the grid. Because the resulting power trades are not necessarily feasible for the real network, TSOs 
undertake “counter-trading operations” in order to re-balance the flows and make them compatible 
with physical grid constraints. We refer to this problem as Model 2 when all TSOs act in a fully 
integrated way to manage network congestion. By using a simplified description of the grid, Model 2 
misrepresents spatial arbitrage possibilities and organizes an incomplete market. 
The current organisation of market-coupling is different and may still evolve. The situation today is 
that each TSO manages congestion on its national grid with multilateral arrangements controlling 
congestion on the interconnections. Because of loop flows, the actions of each TSO or group of TSOs 
have an impact on the network of the other TSOs. We refer to this situation as Model 3 of which we 
consider different views. These views are inspired by the third legislative package that allows for 
multinational TSOs, that is TSOs that cover several countries. Model 3 further degrades the situation 
compared to Model 2 by organizing an incomplete transmission market.  
All real world markets have some degree of inefficiencies and it is not certain ex ante that those 
embedded in Models 2 and 3 are serious, at least if one neglects the incentive to game counter-trading Giorgia Oggioni and Yves Smeers 
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operations as we do here. It all depends on the particular situation on hand, that is, on the capacities of 
the grid and the structure of generation and demand. These things can only be appreciated by 
numerical testing. We introduce these models on a stylized example (see [1] for the mathematical 
details) and apply them on a small prototype model of the pentalateral market where market-coupling 
is currently developed (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and The Netherlands). Surprisingly 
we find that the lack of formal coordination of the counter-trading operations embedded in Model 3 
can be partially substituted by a competitive access to counter-trading resources. In other words an 
internal market of counter-trading resources can in principle restore some of the efficiency that the 
lack of integration of the TSOs normally entails. While this is a weaker requirement than a full 
integration of the TSOs, it is still demanding. We show that a quantitative limitation to the access of 
these resources effectively decreases the efficiency of counter-trading. 
The problem treated here arises from the need to spatially differentiate electricity in a grid 
constrained market. The so-called RTO or ISO organisation that now prevails in several regions of the 
US recognizes the need for a tight integration of the energy and transmission operations. This model 
(that we stylize in Model 1) is now well understood; it is briefly recalled in Section 2 together with 
Chao and Peck (1998, see [2]) six node example that serves to support the conceptual discussion in 
Sections 3 and 4. Europe is pursuing a different approach.
1 “Market-coupling” (MC) is today the most 
advanced European arrangement of cross-border trade. It supposes that national PXs clear the multi-
area energy market on the basis of a simplified ATC (available transmission capacity) description of 
the grid and leaves it to the TSOs to tackle the resulting congestions. We describe the energy market 
clearing part of MC in Section 3. While an integrated European TSO would be in the best position to 
tackle the congestions resulting from the clearing of the energy market Europeans are still hesitant as 
to the degree of integration of transmission that they want to implement. Section 4 examines different 
possibilities for organizing counter-trading operations and discusses the unintended but positive 
impact that some of these methods can have. Section 5 introduces a stylized case study that is then 
elaborated in Section 6. Conclusion terminates the paper. 
2. The six node example and Model 1: the integrated energy and transmission markets 
We introduce the different models on Chao and Peck's six node example (see [2]) depicted in Figure 1. 
The network is composed of eight lines of which (1-6) and (2-5) have limited transfer capacity. 
Generators operate in nodes 1, 2 and 4 and consumers are located in nodes 3, 5 and 6. The network is 
represented by the standard Power Transfer Distribution (PTDF) matrix. The authors assume a 
“flowgate model” as is currently foreseen (but not implemented) in Europe. We therefore conduct the 
discussion in those terms even when assuming fully integrated electricity and transmission markets. 
The flowgate model can be interpreted as zonal or nodal depending on whether the flowgates link 
nodes or zones. The European view is that it should be zonal; we suppose price taking agents and 
hence assume away any incentive to game the system induced by the zonal system. Perfect integration 
supposes that PXs and TSOs are merged into a single entity (the ISO) that behaves as if solving a 
welfare optimization problem constructed on the basis of supply and demand bids. This model is well 
known and not elaborated on here. It is our Model 1.  
                                                      
1 For more information, see the electricity section in the “Florence Forum” on DG Energy at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/forum_electricity_florence_en.htm. Degree of coordination in market-coupling and counter-trading 
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3. Market-coupling (MC) and the clearing of the energy market 
The restructuring of electricity in Europe has seen considerable resistance against the full 
differentiation of electricity by location. The MC organisation adopted in Central Western Europe is 
an intermediate arrangement. In this approach, the energy market spatially clears on a zonal basis 
constructed on a simplified representation of the grid. It is the role of the TSOs to (i) provide the 
energy market with this simplified representation of the grid and to (ii) remedy any line overflow that 
appears after clearing the energy market. Models 2 and 3 are based on the same MC representation of 
the energy market, but differ by how TSOs tackle congestion. 
An example of a two zones market is depicted in Figure 2 for the six node example. There exists 
two PXs, one for each zone; the imports/exports from one zone to the other are capped by some 
transfer limit which here represents the grid. This limit is an Available Transmission Capacity (ATC). 
The computation of the ATC and more generally the construction of the simplified representation of 
the grid by the TSOs go beyond the scope of this paper. The zonal PX clears the domestic market for 
given imports and exports. The different zonal PXs also simultaneously clear the cross-border energy 
market by playing on imports and exports in a way that accounts for the ATC between the zones. All 
in all, we can assume that the two zonal PXs operate in a coordinate way, as if they were just one PX, 
and their actions can be modelled as resulting from a welfare maximization conducted on all 
geographic zones and subject to the sole ATC constraints. 
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4. Counter-trading services 
The clearing of the energy market operated by the PXs is a welfare maximization problem that finds a 
market equilibrium between the quantities of electricity offered and demanded in the whole six node 
market, taking into account the ATC representation of the network. This determines the electricity 
prices in the Northern and Southern zones. The price is unique in the two zones if the ATC is not 
congested. There are different prices otherwise. Because the energy market clears on an ATC model 
that may only be a very imperfect representation of the real grid, the resulting flows may exceed the 
capacities of the physical lines. Counter-trading is an operation whereby TSOs trade incremental of 
decremental injections at the different nodes in order to remove the overflows that result from clearing 
the energy market on the sole ATC model. 
Counter-trading can be organized in different ways: one possibility is for TSOs to jointly remove 
overflows at minimal cost. Another possibility is to have TSOs “cooperate” in a more or less 
formalized way. Counter-trading has a cost which must be charged to the agents of the energy market. 
We compute this cost but do no examine here its impact on energy trade. We use the six node example 
to illustrate different degrees of coordination. In contrast with full coordination which is an 
unambiguous notion, there are many ways to think of imperfect coordination. The discussion that 
follows is thus by nature illustrative. Our final goal however is to characterize the lack of coordination 
in a quantitative way. 
Let  i q  be the vector of injections and withdrawals of the market equilibrium of the PX's welfare 
maximization problem obtained on the ATC network depicted in Figure 2. Assume, for the sake of the 
discussion, that the flows resulting from these  i q  violate the capacity of lines (1-6) and (2-5) of the 
real network in Figure 1. TSOs can act on line flows by purchasing incremental or decremental 
generation or consumption of electricity i q Δ . This means that quantities produced (or consumed) can 
be shifted from one producer (or consumer) to another. These adaptations must be limited though. 
First, they should be feasible (not exceed plant capacity or lead to negative consumption or 
generation). Second, changes of generation should net out to zero for each TSO; similarly changes of 
consumption should net out to zero for each TSO. We introduce more or less coordinated ways of 
conducting this task. 
Let TSO
N and TSO
S be the two TSOs in charge of the Northern and the Southern zones 
respectively. A first assumption discussed in Section 4.1 is to suppose that TSO
N and TSO
S jointly 
solve a unique optimization problem to minimize the total cost of removing the overflows resulting 
from the i q . The alternative is to suppose that TSO
N and TSO
S separately act to remove line overflows 
taking into account the actions of the other. This leads to a Nash equilibrium problem. Sections 4.2.1, 
4.2.2 and 4.2.3 present alternative formulations of this scenario. The mathematical problems and their 
economic interpretations are discussed in detail in a companion paper (see [1]). 
4.1 Model 2: Integrated counter-trading 
Integrated counter-trading is achieved when the TSOs of both zones operate jointly to remove line 
overflows at minimal cost. Note that TSO
N and TSO
S take as given the quantities  i q  that result from 
the clearing of the energy market by MC. The model is an optimization problem (see the companion 
paper [1]) each TSO is in charge of buying and selling counter-trading services in its own area
2 at 
minimal cost, but the optimization is joint. It gives a single price for each counter-trading resource as 
well as for each congested line.  
                                                      
2 Respectively  1,2,3
N
i q = Δ
for the Northern TSON and  4,5,6
S
i q = Δ
for the Southern TSOS. Degree of coordination in market-coupling and counter-trading 
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4.2 Model 3: Coordinated and uncoordinated counter-trading 
As indicated above one can conceive of different imperfectly coordinated counter-trading in different 
ways. We discuss the economic effects of different approaches in this section. 
4.2.1 Implicitly coordinated counter-trading: version 1 of Model 3 
We first assume that each TSO acts independently to manage congestion on the interconnections, 
taking the actions of the other TSO as given. We further assume that each TSO can buy counter-
trading services in both zones. This means that, differently from the case described in Section 4.1, both 
TSOs can trade at each node. We note the actions undertaken by the TSOs as  1,...,6
N
i q = Δ  and  1,...,6
S
i q = Δ . 
The network remains the common good shared by the TSOs but the absence of coordination may 
induce them to assign different values to the congested lines. The plurality of values is the source of a 
market incompleteness that can degrade the transmission market. In economic terms, this problem is a 
Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE). This problem generally has several solutions leading to 
different values implicitly assigned to the interconnections (see [1]).  
The surprising effect of the situation is that, even in absence of full coordination, we find that the 
two TSOs have no choice but assigning the same value to the common transmission constraints. This 
has an economic interpretation. The model assumes that both TSOs trade the same counter-trading 
resources without limitation. They thus pay the same price for those resources. The price of counter-
trading resources determines the value attributed to the congested lines. Identical counter-trading 
resource prices therefore imply identical valuations of the congested lines. Everything happens as if 
counter-trading were operated in an integrated way. The mathematical implication is that the solution 
of the GNE is the solution of the associated Nash Equilibrium, which differs from the GNE by 
assuming a market for the congested flowgates. The policy implication is that it does not hurt to keep 
separate TSOs if there is free access to global counter-trading resources. As we shall see this free 
access is required for the results to hold. 
4.2.2 Uncoordinated counter-trading: version 2 of Model 3 
The above model assumes that both TSOs can resort to all counter-trading resources on an equal basis. 
TSO
N has no priority on Northern resources compared to TSO
S. This sets a single price of counter-
trading for the two TSOs and hence indirectly insures the coordination of their activities. It is unlikely 
in practice that all TSOs would have equal access to all counter-trading resources. We therefore 
consider an alternative case where we suppose that TSO
N has limited access to the Southern resources 
and conversely. More specifically, we assume that TSOs only have limited access to counter-trading 
resources in other control areas and specify a bound on this access. A TSO that hits its quota in 
another jurisdiction therefore faces a scarcity rent that cannot be arbitraged away with the other TSO. 
Because counter-trading resources are now priced differently, the value assigned by the TSOs to the 
congested lines also differs and the perfect coordination is lost. This makes counter-trading inefficient. 
4.2.3 Uncoordinated counter-trading: version 3 of Model 3 
The limit case is the one where a TSO can only access the counter-trading resources of its own area 
and acts taking the actions of the other as given. This creates line valuation differences that cannot be 
arbitraged away. This destroys all possibilities of coordination and increases inefficiencies in counter-
trading. Giorgia Oggioni and Yves Smeers 
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5. A case Study 
We now consider a pilot case study constructed on the basis of the network of the Central Western 
European (CWE) power market depicted in Figure 3. This network is composed of fifteen nodes 
connected by 28 lines with limited capacity distributed over four countries: Germany, France, Belgium 
and The Netherlands. Generators, consumers and different TSOs operate in the two Belgian 
(Merchtem and Gramme) and the three Dutch (Krimpen, Maastricht and Zwolle) nodes as well as in 
the two big French and German nodes. The other French and German nodes are inter-connectors used 
to transfer power only. As with the representation adopted in the six node example, the grid is 
modeled by using a PTDF matrix provided by ECN ([3]). 














Adopting a standard technological representation of the power sector, we assume that eight electricity 
companies
3 plus a fringe of small competitors operate in this market and produce electricity running a 
set of eight different technologies
4 following an endogenously determined merit order. 
We consider a time horizon of one year measured in hours per year, subdivided in two periods with 
different durations (respectively 5,136 h and 3,624 h) and different base load demand. Our focus is 
however not on the distinction between peak and base demand but on the geographical differentiation 
of electricity demand and generation. 
A wholesale reference price of 40 euro/MWh is applied as well as an elasticity of -0.1 in the reference 
point. Our simulations are calibrated with data updated to 2005. Demand data are provided by Eurostat 
while generation capacities come from the public reports of the power companies included in the 
model. 
A PX and a TSO operate in each of the four modeled countries. They are integrated into a single 
pool in the reference “nodal model”. Following European practice, they remain separated entities in 
the other cases. In line with the design of “market-coupling” we assume that an equilibrium 
mechanism links all PXs so that they behave in an integrated way as if there were a unique PX 
operating on a simplified network. On the contrary, TSOs can organize their activities in different 
ways as we explain in the following. 
                                                      
3  E.ON Energie AG, Electrabel SA, Electricité de France, ENBW Energieversorgung Baden-Wurttemberg, Essent Energie 
Productie BV, Nuon, RWE Energie AG, Vattenfall Europe AG. 
4  Specifically, hydro, renewables, nuclear, lignite, coal, CCGT, natural gas and oil base plants. Degree of coordination in market-coupling and counter-trading 
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6. Modelling and results 
We construct several models that correspond to different multinational TSO arrangements made 
possible by the third legislative package. These introduce various degrees of geographic coordination 
of counter-trading, which may in turn have different impacts on electricity trading. The models and the 
results are presented along the same philosophy as in the six node example: we proceed from full to no 
coordination. Model 1 describes the full integration of energy and transmission; it represents the 
perfect coordination where energy is fully differentiated by location (within the limits of our data). 
This arrangement is a “first best”. The other models are of the MC type with an imperfect integration 
of energy and transmission in the sense that the energy market first clears on a simplified 
representation of the grid operated by the PXs and TSOs take care of possible line overflows in a 
second stage. Taking stock of the results of the MC problem, Model 2 supposes a fully coordinated 
counter-trading with a single TSO covering Belgium, France, Germany and The Netherlands. This 
implementation of market-coupling is a “second best”. It represents the most efficient implementation 
of the third package. Model 3 effectively consists of a set of models of alternative TSO arrangements. 
All TSO operations are conducted on the flowgate description of the grid given in Figure 3. This 
representation is taken from [4]. In contrast the PXs operate on an ATC representation of the grid 
depicted in Figure 4. This representation supposes that the network is subdivided into four zones 
connected by ATCs. Market-coupling is currently conducted on an ATC model but a move to a “flow 
based” model (which is effectively a flowgate model) is foreseen for 2010. No information is available 
on the current organisation of counter-trading, the official philosophy being that a proper definition of 
the ATC suffices to solve grid problems. We now present these different models in more detail. 






6.1 Model 1: The full integration of energy and transmission 
All PXs and TSOs are integrated in a single entity. This is the standard “nodal system” (which is here 
effectively a zonal system because of data limitation). It avoids what Hogan calls “the fallacy of 
separation” and corresponds to Joskow's “textbook'” model (see [5]). There is a single physical model 
of the grid, which is the one depicted in Figure 3. 
The solution of this model highlights that congestion only occurs on the interconnections between 
Belgium and The Netherlands on one side and Belgium and France on the other side. The social 
welfare is 267,124,462,455 €. By construction, the flows resulting from the joint clearing of the energy 
and transmission markets are feasible for the grid.  Giorgia Oggioni and Yves Smeers 
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6.1.1 Sensitivity analysis 
We also conduct a simple sensitivity analysis on Model 1 by modifying the values of the reference 
demands used to calibrate the demand functions. We find that increases of the reference electricity 
demands by 5, 10 and 20% respectively lead to social welfares of 279,254,121,514 €, 
291,080,340,843€ and 313,591,708,405 €.  
6.2 The energy market in the “market-coupling” of Models 2 and 3 
Models 2 and 3 separate the PXs and the TSOs. This falls into the “fallacy of separation” and departs 
from the successful “textbook” approach (see [5]). Following the principle of market-coupling we 
assume a different PX in each of the four markets but suppose that market clearing takes place on a 
geographic basis described by the ATC network of Figure 4. 
The clearing of the sole energy market in Models 2 and 3 (that is the outcome of the coordinated 
activities of the PXs) leads to overflows on fourteen lines. These comprise both interconnections 
(Germany-Netherlands, Netherlands-Belgium, Belgium-France, France-Germany) and domestic 
(German, Dutch and Belgian) lines. The social welfare resulting from the sole clearing of the energy 
market, that is before removing violations of line constraints, amounts to 267,570,731,848 €. There is 
a welfare increase of 0.17%. This amounts to 446 million €/year. This increase is artificial though, as 
it is only permitted by violating line constraints.  
6.3 Model 2: Market-coupling with integrated counter-trading 
Because the clearing of the energy market in all cases but Model 1 relies on the simplified 
representation of the grid (Figure 4) its outcome is not necessarily feasible for the grid. A second step 
is thus required whereby TSOs engage in counter-trading in order to remove congestion, both national 
and on the inter-connectors. The third package allows for the inception of multinational TSOs, but 
does not impose them. Following the discussion of the six node example we introduce different 
organisations that also involve multinational TSOs. A first case supposes a single TSO covering the 
four countries and operating on the grid depicted in Figure 3. This constitutes Model 2. 
The coordinated action of TSOs in Model 2 removes the line overflows occurring from the clearing 
of the energy market. The interesting result is that congested lines and marginal values of those lines 
are identical to those of Model 1. Counter-trading operations imply re-dispatching costs that decrease 
the social welfare by 4 Million €/year (-0.0015%) compared to Model 1. This is reported in Table 1. 
This loss of welfare is the price to pay for the separation of the energy and transmission markets. This 
price is here small: averaging the cost of counter-trading on the whole load of the region leads to a 
value of 0.374 €/MWh. 
Table 1: Welfare and average re-dispatching costs (Models 1 and 2) 
  Social Welfare (euro)  Re-dispatching costs (euro/MWh) 
Model 1  267,124,462,455  
Model 2  267,120,396,787 0.374 
 
 
6.3.1 Sensitivity analysis 
Table 2 extends the sensitivity analysis to Model 2. As we did in Model 1, we consider increases of 
the reference electricity demand of 5, 10 and 20%. Degree of coordination in market-coupling and counter-trading 
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Reference  450,335,061 0.374  267,120,396,787 
Increase 5%  431,283,689 0.346  279,249,137,781 
Increase 10%  549,816,403 0.426  291,066,310,376 
Increase 20%  321,992,912 0.240  313,589,922,952 
The average re-dispatching costs now amounts to 0.346, 0.426 and 0.240 €/MWh for 5, 10 and 20% 
increases of the energy demand respectively. Welfare losses with regard to the corresponding 
scenarios of the sensitivity analysis of Model 1 are respectively 4.9, 14 and 1.7 Million €/year. Neither 
average re-dispatching cost nor welfare loss is monotone with load because congestion is not 
monotone with load.  
6.4 Model 3: Market-coupling with imperfect coordination of TSOs 
The history of European cross border trade reveals that stakeholders prefer bilateral arrangements to 
integrated solutions. The results of Model 2 showed that the only congestions remaining after 
integrated counter-trading operations are those of the interconnections between France and Belgium 
and Belgium and The Netherlands. This suggests a less integrated approach where congestion 
problems are handled in the regions where they occur. Model 3 considers a set of these approaches as 
we describe now. 
6.4.1 Model 3.1: A trilateral TSO (F-B-NL) 
The sole congestion on interconnections between France and Belgium and Belgium and The 
Netherlands suggests an organisation whereby a single TSO covering the Belgian, French and Dutch 
markets manages congestion by counter-trading in these three countries (this is the current trilateral 
market (see Belpex web site)), leaving German injections and withdrawals identical to those 
determined in the clearing of the energy market. We depict this situation on Figure 5. 







Since there is a multinational TSO in charge of removing congestion occurring in the Belgian, French 
and Dutch markets and there is no action by the German TSO, the problem boils down to a single 
optimization problem where the trilateral TSOs (F-B-NL) eliminates congestion at minimal welfare 
loss. Giorgia Oggioni and Yves Smeers 
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We find that the re-dispatching cost slightly increases compared to the one observed in Model 2. 
Welfare amounts to 267,116,142,245 € which corresponds to losses of 4.2 (0.002%) and 8.3 million 
€/year (0.003%) with respect to the values obtained in Models 2 and 1 respectively (compare to Table 
1). Welfare losses increase compared to Model 2 because the German TSO no longer contributes to 
counter-trading. This may look surprising as there is no residual congestion on the lines with Germany 
in the outcome of Model 2 and a pure ATC reasoning would suggest that there is thus no reason to 
involve the German TSO. However Kirchhoff's laws justify involving this TSO in order to reduce the 
overall cost of congestion. This illustrates the fallacy of the idea of removing congestion at the local 
level. Averaging the re-dispatching cost over the load of the trilateral market gives 0.693 €/MWh. 
Averaging this re-dispatching cost over the whole load gives 0.377903 €/MWh (approximately 0.378 
€/MWh). Needless to say the German TSO is likely to object to charging operators in its control area 
in order to contribute to congestion relief in the trilateral market.  
6.4.2 Model 3.2: A hybrid system: one trilateral TSO (F-B-NL) and two bilateral TSOs (G-NL) and 
(G-F) 
It is known (and confirmed by sensitivity analysis) that congestion can occur on the Germany-
Netherlands and France-Germany interconnections. Generalizing the decentralized view of counter-
trading, one introduces an organisation whereby three multilateral TSOs intervene to manage 
congestion. Specifically, we keep the (F-B-NL) TSO for handling congestion in the trilateral market 
but also introduce two bilateral TSOs (G-NL) and (G-F) to manage congestion on the Dutch-German 
and French-German interconnections respectively. This new arrangement, aimed at increasing 
coordination among TSOs, is depicted on Figure 6. 









Invoking the discussion of Section 4.2.1, one observes that this arrangement creates arbitrage 
possibilities on Dutch and French counter-trading resources respectively; these are traded away if (F-
B-NL) and (G-NL) pay the same price for Dutch counter-trading resources and (F-B-NL) and (G-F) 
similarly pay the same price for French resources. We thus end up in a situation where even though 
(F-B-NL), (B-NL) and (G-NL) behave in principle in an uncoordinated way, their paying identical 
prices for counter-trading resources on some markets implicitly forces some coordination between 
them. Our simulations confirm this reasoning: we obtain the results of the explicit TSOs' coordination 
of Model 2. 
We mentioned in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 that this problem is a Generalized Nash Equilibrium and 
hence generally has many solutions (depending on the bargaining power of the different agents). It is 
remarkable that our attempts to find alternative solutions by giving more or less weight to some TSOs Degree of coordination in market-coupling and counter-trading 
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failed: the sole fact of the different TSOs paying the same price for common counter-trading resources 
forces the implicit coordination that leads to the same outcome as the explicit coordination of Model 2.  
This desired result does not come for free. It requires that TSOs have non-discriminatory access to 
common re-dispatching resources (Dutch resources for (F-B-NL) and (G-NL) and French resources 
for (F-B-NL) and (F-G)). As explained above, even though there is no explicit trading of 
interconnection capacities at the counter-trading level in Model 3.2 (in contrast with Model 2), the fact 
that TSOs or groups of TSOs resort to identical counter-trading resources for which they pay the same 
price implies that they effectively see the same value for interconnections capacities. The set of 
solutions of the Generalized Nash equilibrium reduces to the single solution of the associated Nash 
Equilibrium problem where interconnections capacities are effectively traded among TSOs. This is the 
result achieved by perfect coordination of the counter-trading operations in Model 2. The next model 
delves somewhat deeper into what happens when one relaxes the assumption of non discriminatory 
access to counter-trading resources.  
6.4.3 Model 3.3: A mental experiment: two bilateral TSOs (F-B) and (B-NL) in the trilateral market 
We delve into the implicit coordination mechanism underlying Model 3.2 by considering a simplified 
situation where the trilateral TSO (B-F-NL) is split into two bilateral TSOs (F-B) and (B-NL) that 
separately take care of the congestion in the sole trilateral market. The case focuses on the implicit 
coordination that automatically occurs as a result of non discriminatory and unlimited access to the 
resources common to these two bilateral TSOs (here Belgian resources). This arrangement is depicted 
in Figure 7. 








The economic interpretation of this model is that there is a common market for the use of Belgian 
counter-trading resources by the (F-B) and (B-NL) TSOs, which thus value them at the same price. In 
contrast there is no common market of interconnection capacities, which TSOs can therefore value 
differently. Again, this model is a Generalized Nash Equilibrium of the type considered in Sections 
4.2.1 and 4.2.2. We want to explore the extent to which access to common counter-trading resources 
forces coordination among TSOs. 
Suppose first that (F-B) and (B-NL) have full and non-discriminatory access to Belgian TSO 
resources. Numerical simulation shows that we fall back on the solution obtained in Section 6.4.1. 
Even though we do not explicitly impose coordination of (F-B) and (B-NL) operations, arbitrage on 
Belgian counter-trading resources implicitly forces this coordination. This result holds true whatever 
the respective weights given to the two TSOs in the solution of the Generalized Nash Equilibrium. The 
only solution of the Generalized Nash Equilibrium is the solution of the associated Nash Equilibrium, Giorgia Oggioni and Yves Smeers 
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in this case also the solution of the optimization problem of Section 6.4.1, that trades interconnections 
capacities.  
Table 3: Welfare, total and average re-dispatching costs of the scenario where (B-NL) has 
limited action in Belgium 
Variation limits 






936  455,591,481 0.377904  267,116,140,367 
936*0.5  454,591,481 0.377904  267,116,140,367 
936*0.1  460,145,326 0.382521  267,110,586,522 
Suppose next that the access to Belgian counter-trading resources by one of these bilateral TSOs is 
limited. This asymmetric arrangement is meant to represent one of these heterogeneous organisations 
that so often prevail in the EU. We now test whether the restriction of arbitrage possibilities limits the 
implicit coordination. The following reports a sample of the such results. Suppose that (F-B) has full 
access to the Belgian counter-trading resources, while access to these resources is restricted for (B-
NL). Results are reported in Table 3 that is interpreted as follows. The value “936” in the first column 
corresponds to the largest capacity of the congested lines between Belgium and The Netherlands. It is 
taken as an upper bound on the amount of counter-trading resources necessary to relieve congestion 
between Belgium and The Netherlands. The coefficient that multiplies this value expresses the fraction 
of this amount of counter-trading resources available to (B-NL). The other columns are self 
explanatory. The average counter-trading cost is computed by dividing the counter-trading cost by the 
load of the trilateral market. 
Similar outcomes are reported in Table 4 where we consider a symmetric scenario where the (F-B) 
TSO has limited access to the re-dispatching resources in Belgium. In this case, the value “898” in the 
first column of the table is the highest capacity of congested lines between France and Belgium. 
Table 4: Welfare, total and average re-dispatching costs of the scenario where (F-B) has limited 
action in Belgium 
Variation limits 






898  454,592,586 0.377905  267,116,139,261 
898*0.5  454,878,412 0.378143  267,115,853,435 
898*0.1  656,384,167 0.545655  266,914,347,681 
We observe that reducing the access of either the (F-B) TSO or the (B-NL) TSO to the common 
Belgian resources increases the re-dispatching cost, thereby causing possibly important decreases of 
the corresponding social welfare compared to the results of Model 3.1 (267,116,142,245 €). These 
amount to 5.5 and 202 million € for the cases “936*0.1” and “898*0.1” respectively. This is explained 
as follows. Constraining the recourse to counter-trading resources for one agent introduces a scarcity 
rent that adds to the opportunity cost of this agent when it hits its quota. Because prices of counter-
trading resources are no longer the same, valuation of the interconnections at opportunity cost is no 
longer the same and perfect coordination is lost (see Section 4.2.2). 
6.4.4 Model 3.4: Uncoordinated counter-trading with four national TSOs 
The situation deteriorates significantly when the four TSOs of Model 3 operate independently. In this 
last case, depicted in Figure 8, we suppose that counter-trading is run by the purely national TSOs. Degree of coordination in market-coupling and counter-trading 
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We find that this model is infeasible: uncoordinated TSO cannot remove the line overflows created by 
the clearing of the energy market in market-coupling. The infeasibility comes from the violation of the 
capacities of four interconnections (Germany and The Netherlands, Belgium and The Netherlands, 
France and Belgium and France and Belgium). Only an expansion of the network may restore 
feasibility. In particular, significant increases of the capacity of these lines remove overflows. These 
additional capacities amount to +40% for the Belgian-French inter-connectors and +200% for the 
Belgian-Dutch inter-connector. 
Notwithstanding these capacity increases, the results obtained with this modified model still reveals 
a quite inefficient solution. Not counting the cost of capacity additions the social welfare amounts to 
264,181,743,898 € (1.1% lower than in Model 1). This is equivalent to a welfare loss of 2.9 billion 
€/year; a figure that is considerably higher than what was observed before. Moreover, the average re-
dispatching cost in The Netherlands is quite high (35.67 €/MWh). In Belgium, this average is lower 
(4.32 €/MWh), but still higher than the values encountered in the previous scenario. Note that there are 
no re-dispatching costs in France and in Germany (see Table 5). Congestion problems remain on 
interconnections and Belgium and The Netherlands where national TSOs handle them at the above 
mentioned costs. 
Table 5: Average re-dispatching costs  
Re-dispatching costs 
(euro/MWh) 
G  F  B  NL 
0.00 0.00 4.32 35.67 
The conclusion of an impossible removal of line overflows by the four TSOs acting independently 
may look unrealistic. Even if an illustrative case study cannot pretend to realistic data and hence 
realistic results, most will argue that this outcome is too excessive to be meaningful. We conclude by 
explaining that it is in fact quite plausible. It should be recalled here that the capacities assumed in the 
PX model of market-coupling are obtained by simply adding the capacities of the lines. This gives the 
PX enormous trading possibilities, in fact higher than those that are effectively possible. The results of 
Models 2 and 3 show that coordinated counter-trading allows one to accommodate this trade, but at a 
cost. In contrast the absence of cooperation makes counter-trading ineffective. The interpretation of 
the result is immediate: TSOs offer transmission capacities that are much lower than the real 
possibilities of the grid. The comparison of this with the other models illustrates how much one 
sacrifices on energy trading possibilities to allow TSOs to remain independent.  Giorgia Oggioni and Yves Smeers 
14 
7. Conclusion 
These formulations provide different insights into what TSO cooperation can bring to the internal 
electricity market. The integration of the energy and transmission is the paradigm of efficiency. We 
also find that MC with an integrated TSO (Model 2) can be reasonably efficient if agents do not take 
advantage of that separation to game the counter-trading market. Interestingly we also find that 
multilateral arrangements where different TSOs procure counter-trading resources on the same terms 
can partially substitute full coordination. This result is attractive but still requires an internal market of 
counter-trading resources. These should be available to all TSOs without price discrimination or 
restriction of access. Any limitation of the recourse to these resources, whether resulting from 
regulatory measures or just pure economics (e.g. the French TSO not resorting to German resources 
because it is not economic to do so) jeopardizes the coordination result, therefore leading to a more 
costly counter-trading. The most striking result is the impact of uncoordinated counter-trading. 
Independent TSOs can only manage the congestion resulting from MC with a drastic increase of 
network capacities. In practice, this means that independent TSOs effectively manage congestions by 
drastically restricting the possibilities of the grid compared to what could be done with a more 
integrated solution.  
One should note in closing that we adopted a very optimistic view on counter-trading resources. 
We supposed that all resources available to the energy markets are also available for counter-trading. 
This is unrealistic and should be adapted when moving from an academic illustrative study to a real 
analysis.  Degree of coordination in market-coupling and counter-trading 
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